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INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to express Post Keynesian international finance theory 
in terms of the theories of liquidity preference and endogenous credit creation, 
theories which have been more fully developed in the context of the domestic 
economy.  
 
Traditionally, the area of international finance has featured more prominently in Post 
Keynesian work addressing particular policy issues than in Post Keynesian theory as 
such. This has mirrored to some degree Keynes’s own treatment of international 
finance as an area for application of theory than for particular theoretical treatment. 
Thus, two recent accounts of Post Keynesian theory, Arestis (1992) and Lavoie (1992) 
deal primarily with the closed economy. 
 
The major exception to this generalisation is the work of Paul Davidson. In 
International Money and the Real World (Davidson, 1982), he devoted an entire 
volume to the development of a Post Keynesian theory of international finance and a 
drawing out of its policy implications, particularly with respect to reform of the 
international monetary system. An updated synopsis of this work appears in Davidson 
(1994), where international economics is given prominence in his statement of Post 
Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Tarshis (1984) too has focused theoretical attention 
on the international monetary system, again with a view to its reform. 
 
But more recently, increasing attention has been paid to international finance, 
reflecting the increasing incidence of issues to be addressed. The tremendous increase 
in the size and instability of international financial markets since the 1970s, the 
emergence of the debt crisis, the search for appropriate exchange rate regimes, and the 
institutional arrangements for the IMF and European Monetary Union have all 
attracted the attention of Post Keynesian economists. 
 
In the following sections, these various themes which have been developed to address 
particular policy issues are brought together in a theory of international finance which 
draws explicitly on the theory of liquidity preference and the theory of endogenous 
credit creation. This theoretical perspective is laid out in the next section, and applied 
to questions of analysis and governance of the international financial system in the 
following section.  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
CREDIT CREATION 
 
This section is devoted to setting out a Post Keynesian theory of international finance 
which uses developments in Post Keynesian monetary theory. These developments 
have included a bringing together of liquidity preference theory and endogenous credit 
theory which, for a time, were treated as alternative approaches to Post Keynesian 
monetary theory. This international version of Post Keynesian monetary theory 
provides a coherent framework within which to address a range of policy issues. 
 
Liquidity preference is the demand for a perfectly tradable asset with stable value. The 
theory of liquidity preference underpins Davidson’s (1982) analysis of international 
money. This theory has conventionally been presented as explaining the preferred 
disposition of a stock of assets among different liquidities. Following Keynes (1936, 
chapter 17), the motives for demanding liquidity can be classified as: 
 the transactions motive, which is a stable positive function of  transactions, for 
which income is generally regarded as an adequate proxy 
 the speculative motive, which is determined by expectations as to capital gain on 
alternative assets 
 the precautionary motive; while this has traditionally been treated as a relatively 
passive element of liquidity preference, represented as a stable positive function of 
income, attention has increasingly been focused  on precautionary demand as the 
key outlet for instability. Thus, for example, Runde (1994) argues that, while 
speculative demand reflects decision-making as if there were certainty about 
expectations of capital gain, precautionary demand reflects uncertainty; the less 
confidence there is in predictions, the greater the precautionary demand for 
liquidity. 
 
Within a domestic economy, the national currency is generally the asset which is most 
liquid and most stable in value.But within the international economy, there are a range 
of moneys. As long as each has a stable value in relation to the others, then the most 
liquid of these is generally employed as a means of payment and unit of account; this 
would normally be the national currency of the economy concerned. But, where the 
domestic value of the national currency is falling significantly relative to foreign 
currencies, because of domestic inflation or a depreciating exchange rate, other 
currencies may better satisfy liquidity preference. This is more likely to be the case the 
more free is capital mobility, ie the more liquid is foreign currency. It is a matter of 
relativities; in cases of hyper-inflation, capital controls may not be sufficient to 
prevent demonetisation and the substitution of foreign currency for domestic currency. 
It is also a matter of past experience and conventions; where the US dollar has in the 
past been generally accepted in payment in a non-US economy (whether legally or 
not), the more easily will the dollar be substituted for domestic currency at signs of 
that currency weakening. 
 
The relevance of liquidity preference understood in these traditional terms is thus two-
fold. First, changing domestic and/or foreign conditions may alter what satisfies 
liquidity preference, and thus alter relative currency demands. Second, changing 
degrees of liquidity preference at home or abroad  may alter relative currency demand 
depending on which currency satisfies liquidity preference (see Dow, 1986-87). 
 
In the first case, suppose that, for a given degree of liquidity preference, there is a loss 
of confidence in the stability of the value of the domestic currency relative to other 
currencies, so that foreign currencies better satisfy that liquidity preference. Then 
capital outflows will put downward pressure on the exchange rate. If the monetary 
authorities are committed to maintaining a stable exchange rate, they will have to buy 
up domestic currency with foreign exchange reserves and put upward pressure on 
interest rates in order to stem the capital outflows. If the expectation of falling value 
of the domestic currency is such that the authorities cannot attract sufficient capital 
inflows, then the limitations on foreign exchange reserves will be such as to cause a 
crisis, requiring a devaluation. If the exchange rate is floating, the decline in its value 
may create an unstable situation if it further reduces the capacity of the domestic 
currency to satisfy liquidity preference; again the authorities may put upward pressure 
on interest rates to attempt to stem the capital outflow. 
 
In the second case, suppose there is a rise in liquidity preference in a particular 
economy. Other things being equal, domestic interest rates will rise. If foreign 
currency is a repository for liquidity preference, there will also be a tendency for 
capital outflow, requiring that domestic interest rates rise even further than would 
otherwise be the case in order to make holders of domestic assets satisfied with 
holding them. At the same time, if the rise on liquidity preference is caused by some 
deterioration in the domestic economy, foreign investors might be less willing to hold 
the economy’s assets, requiring an even larger rise in interest rates. If the monetary 
authorities are committed to maintaining a stable value for the exchange rate, then 
they must hold the exchange value up by selling foreign exchange reserves and by 
keeping interest rates high in order to stem capital outflows. If the exchange rate is 
floating, then its value will be free to fall. There is a danger that this fall might change 
the relative degrees to which domestic and foreign currency satisfy liquidity 
preference, so that the two international elements to liquidity preference outlined here 
may compound each other. In either case, the openness of the monetary system to a 
range of moneys exacerbates the domestic effects of liquidity preference. But much 
depends on the cause of the rise in liquidity preference; if it accompanies growth in 
the domestic economy, capital inflows may be attracted which satisfy the need for 
greater liquidity. 
 
But this discussion has referred to liquidity preference within the domestic economy, 
regardless of international transactions. But liquidity preference may also be 
considered specifically with respect to international transactions, ie a demand for 
liquidity which would not be present in a closed economy. There is a transactions 
demand for a vehicle for international payments, which bears a stable relationship 
with the value of world trade. There is also a transactions demand with respect to 
capital flows, which can be represented as a stable function of the value of these 
flows. The more unstable are international financial markets, the more the incentive 
for international capital flows, and therefore the greater the transactions demand for an 
international means of payment. 
 
The international equivalent of speculative demand for money is more complex than 
domestic speculative demand, since exchange loss from holding one currency is 
mirrored by exchange gain from holding another. Speculative demand should capture 
the holding of a stable (as opposed to appreciating), liquid asset in order to avoid 
exchange or capital loss. This demand may be identified in demand for stable, as 
opposed to appreciating, currencies, or for gold as an alternative to national 
currencies. It may also be identified in demand for overnight deposits in foreign 
currency, to allow for day-to-day exchange speculation, rather than longer-term 
foreign assets. In the domestic money market, the choice with respect to speculative 
demand is to hold money or longer-term assets with the prospect of capital gain; a rise 
in speculative demand puts upward pressure on interest rates. In the international 
context, the choice is to hold short-term assets in one stable currency (or, often, gold), 
and in short-term assets rather than longer-term assets. The latter serves to put upward 
pressure on interest rates in international markets. 
 
The more unstable are exchange rates, the greater the prospect for gains to be made by 
currency substitution, and thus the greater the demand for liquid balances in one 
currency or another in order to take advantage of day-to-day changes in the foreign 
exchange market. Strictly speaking, this demand should be regarded as a sub-category 
of transactions demand (for speculative transactions). Further the greater the 
uncertainty about exchange rates, the greater the demand for liquid international assets 
in the absence of firmer expectations. This demand is more properly regarded as 
precautionary demand.  
 
In addition to private sector liquidity preference, there is a need for liquidity for 
monetary authorities to meet clearing imbalances between themselves; this might be 
seen as a form of precautionary demand, to meet unforeseen imbalances. The level 
of demand depends on the propensity for imbalance, which depends partly on the 
degree of economic divergence and the degree to which capital flows allow adequate 
time for economies to adjust to imbalance. But the incidence of imbalance also 
reflects the strength of short-term capital flows, ie on the strength and instability of  
speculative activity in foreign exchange markets. In addition, the private sector may 
also have a precautionary demand for international money if there is a general loss of 
confidence in international assets. This could be a powerful force, the effect being 
reduced availability of medium and long-term lending across currencies, and rising 
interest rates. This would also feed back on the precautionary demand by monetary 
authorities, in that it would be more difficult to fund imbalances with capital flows; 
official precautionary demand would accordingly increase. 
 
It is of considerable significance whether or not there is an international money other 
than a national currency, ie whether or not an increase in demand for international 
money is also an increase in demand for a national currency. In the Bretton Woods 
system, the dollar was regarded as providing international liquidity, being easily 
traded and of stable value. The dollar thus satisfied the need for an international 
means of payment. Transactions demand for it grew with the growth in world trade 
and capital flows; the supply of international money in the form of gold or, later, 
Special Drawing Rights, could not keep pace. But this in itself created a structural 
imbalance in the US balance of payments, requiring massive capital inflows 
corresponding to the increasing need for international liquidity; the intrinsic economic 
conditions in the US itself would rather have warranted capital outflows. The dollar 
standard broke down in 1971 when the consequence of the dollar’s role in the 
international monetary system allowed the US to run a massive trade deficit which 
undermined the expected stability of the value of the dollar, ie its capacity to be 
acceptable as an international money. 
 
Since then, there has been a tremendous increase also in the demand for international 
money. The oil crisis, and attempts to deal with its consequences by means of 
monetarist policies led to widespread structural imbalances which could not quickly 
be addressed by conventional adjustment policies. Liquidity was required to finance 
these imbalances; fortunately that liquidity was made available by banks recycling 
deposits by surplus countries. The ensuing instability of international financial 
markets (including the market in foreign exchange) also increased demand for 
precautionary balances in order to take quick advantage of expected shifts in exchange 
rates. Not only did this put upward pressure on interest rates, but it also provided the 
ready fuel for exchange speculation, adding to the underlying structural imbalance. 
This increasing demand for international liquidity was still predominantly satisfied by 
national currencies perceived to have most stable value and most general international 
acceptance. 
 
But the 1970s and 1980s were also characterised by the increasing provision of 
liquidity through the international financial system, ie the banks, rather than the 
international monetary system, ie the IMF and national monetary authorities. 
Discussion of the international monetary system had focused on the provision of 
international ‘outside money’ (balances with the IMF in the drawing and Special 
Drawing Right accounts), as if international bank money were a stable multiple. This 
mirrored (and, some argue, influenced) the increasing tendency domestically to focus 
on bank reserves with the domestic central bank as a means of controlling monetary 
aggregates. In contrast, the theory of endogenous money was being put forward by 
Post Keynesians (notably Kaldor, 1982, and Moore, 1988) to shift attention to bank 
credit as the causal force, bank reserves being at the end of the causal chain. 
 
The role of the banks in providing credit was the starting-point of Tarshis’s (1984) 
analysis of the international monetary system. What this implies is that the expression 
of liquidity preference was not restricted to the disposition of a given stock of assets, 
but in addition influenced the total availability of liquidity. Certainly there was a 
recycling of payments imbalances within the Eurodollar market. But this coincided 
with a general expansion in the provision of credit by the banking system driven by 
competitive forces within the banking system (see Chick, 1986). Domestically, 
banking systems were exercising increasing control over credit expansion, with 
reserves accommodating this expansion.  
 
The bulk of international banking activity has been channelled through the Eurodollar 
market, which has expanded at a dramatic pace independent of domestic reserve 
requirements. It has been argued that, as a wholesale market, the Eurodollar market 
acted as a pure intermediary rather than a creator of credit (see for example Niehans 
and Hewson, 1976). In other words, since its liabilities are not a means of payment, 
the Eurobanks did not engage in significant maturity transformation; they borrowed 
and lent medium term. But the Eurodollar market has since shown itself to be capable 
of changing the degree of maturity transformation as conditions have changed. In 
particular, when the optimistic expectations of the 1970s proved unjustified and banks 
faced the possibility of default on sovereign debt, the term of future borrowing 
shortened. Strange (1986) demonstrates the increasing preference of the banks to keep 
their assets liquid as the international financial system became increasingly turbulent. 
 
Strange’s argument reflects something which was evident in Keynes’s own work (see 
Dow, forthcoming) and which is now increasingly expressed in Post Keynesian 
monetary theory (see Cottrell, 1994 and  Hewitson, 1995), that the theory of liquidity 
preference has more general application than households’ preferences with respect to 
a given stock of assets. In particular it applies also to the banking system itself in its 
determination of the volume and distribution of credit creation. (see Dow and Dow, 
1989; Dow, 1993, chapter 11). Thus the money supply is best understood as the 
balance sheet counterpart of the supply of credit, which can be understood in terms of 
liquidity preference in the credit market. Here the focus is on the precautionary 
element of liquidity preference. When firms are confident in their expectations about 
returns to investment projects, their preference for precautionary balances is low, and 
their willingness to commit themselves to an investment project and a debt contract is 
high; demand for credit is high. The same applies to investment in financial assets 
financed by borrowing. When banks share that confidence, their perceived lender’s 
risk is low, and their willingness to extend credit is high. Credit expands when the 
preference for precautionary liquid balances is low. Correspondingly, when 
confidence is low and the demand for precautionary balances is high, banks are less 
willing to expand credit and thus the provision of liquidity is low. Banks differ from 
other sectors, however, in that their liquidity preference would take the form of 
holding imperfectly liquid assets (such as interbank loans) rather than perfectly liquid 
assets. 
 
An equivalent argument can be developed with respect to economies for which the 
state of expectations is different (see Chick and Dow, 1988). Thus, economies for 
which expectations of  economic growth (or at least growth in the value of assets) are 
held with confidence will express low liquidity preference, resulting in easy credit 
conditions. Economies for which expectations are not held with confidence will 
experience tight credit conditions.  This phenomenon is illustrated by the balance 
sheet evidence in the Eurodollar market which shows low-income developing 
countries maintaining more liquid positions than higher-income developing countries, 
ie higher deposits relative to borrowing. This trend became more marked in the 1990s 
as banks increased their liquidity preference. (See Dow, 1995.) Clearly this outcome, 
depending as it does on the confidence with which expectations are held, is to a large 
extent a product of knowledge, or lack of knowledge. Thus, optimistic expectations 
about the creditworthiness of developing country borrowers were held with 
confidence by the banks in the 1970s on the basis of very limited knowledge. But the 
flimsiness of the knowledge base meant that, once attention was drawn to the risk of 
default when Mexico announced its intention to default in 1982, the reversal in 
expectations was very dramatic. 
 
The banks, and firms, have reacted to the confounding of expectations in the 1980s by 
increasing their liquidity preference, preferring shorter-term commitments. The 
resulting trend towards securitisation has added to the speculative opportunities 
offered by exchange instability and the more general instability in international 
financial markets.  Derivatives, developed initially to provide protection from the 
ensuing risks facing traders, were soon seized on as offering even more opportunity 
for speculation. By 1991 the notional value of the derivatives market was $8trillion, or 
140% of US GDP (see Kelly, 1995, 215). 
 
The current situation can thus be characterised as one of internationally high liquidity 
preference which is limiting the provision of liquidity to borrowers perceived to pose 
high risks, but which is fuelling activity in speculative markets where the risks are 
potentially much higher, but where banks express more confidence in securing a high 
return. International liquidity is provided by those currencies perceived to have stable 
value; but that stability is vulnerable to the expectations of international financial 
markets. In 1992 these markets demonstrated their capacity to pick off currencies at 
will, breaking up the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, and setting back attempts 
to promote exchange stability in Europe in the run-up to European Monetary Union. 
Further, the effect of this increase in liquidity preference, and the consequential rise in 
speculative activity, has been to raise interest rates in international financial markets, 
with knock-on effects for domestic markets. 
 
Finally, once the focus is put on credit as well as money, the scope for differences in 
domestic banking systems assumes importance, belying the presumed homogeneity of 
global monetarism. When considering the impact on domestic economies of higher 
interest rates and the decisions of international banks with respect to credit 
availability, attention must be paid to the nature of the domestic banking system. 
Monetarist theory suggests that any inflow of foreign exchange is homogeneous, 
adding to the reserves of the domestic banking system, and being multiplied in an 
expansion of domestic credit. Further, gross substitutability between assets, domestic 
and foreign, ensures that domestic interest rates will respond to international interest 
rates. But national banking systems differ in a variety of ways. First, a domestic 
concern borrowing from an international bank may retain its balances outside the 
domestic banking system, so that the capital inflow is purely notional.  Second, the 
effect of a capital inflow on domestic bank reserves may be sterilised by the domestic 
monetary authority. Quite apart from stage of banking development, there are marked 
differences in formal regulation and in informal convention which influence the 
relationship between international financial developments and the domestic banking 
system (see Chick and Dow, forthcoming,b). Third, if there is an addition to domestic 
bank reserves there may be no direct effect on domestic credit provision. If confidence 
in domestic assets is low, the banks may prefer not to be lent up, or to lend outside the 
domestic economy, cancelling out the capital inflow. Further, banking systems are less 
constrained by reserves the later the stage of development (see Chick, 1986). Highly 
developed banking systems determine credit creation first and accommodate it with 
reserves second. While this occurs as soon as there is a lender-of-last-resort, the 
latitude enjoyed by the banks, and the compulsion to exploit that latitude, increases 
with banking development. Finally, when banks at different stages of development 
compete, banks at an earlier stage of development are at a disadvantage; because their 
redeposit ratio is less assured, their willingness to expand their loan protfolios is 
accordingly reduced. The effect of international liquidity preference on interest rates 
may then be exaggerated in domestic banks struggling to compete for deposits with 
international banks. 
 
In the next section we turn attention to the various issues addressed in the Post 
Keynesian literature on international finance, in terms of the design of the 
international monetary system, given developments in the international financial 
system. We consider this literature in the light of the theoretical perspective set out in 
this section.  
 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
 
The issues facing the international monetary system can be summarised as follows: 
 The need for an international money whose value is independent of the 
internal policies of any national government, ie the need for a single asset with 
assured monetary attributes, whose use does not in itself create adjustment 
problems for any one economy. As long as there is a range of moneys, ie there is 
a high elasticity of substitution between different moneys, then no one form of 
money satisfies the necessary requirements of money. Further, if these moneys are 
national currencies, substitution between them creates both balance of payments 
problems, and opportunities for potentially destabilising speculation, which further 
reduces the money-like qualities of some of the currencies. Since an asset must 
inspire confidence in its value, the preferred Post Keynesian option is to design an 
international money, for which a global agency acts as central bank; that money’s 
attributes must be such as to make it the preferred money, relative to national 
currencies.  
  
 The need for greater symmetry in the pressures to adjust to balance of 
payments deficits and surpluses; the current relative pressure to adjust to 
deficits lends a deflationary bias to the world economy. The Post Keynesian 
focus on distribution issues highlights the distributional consequences of relative 
power in international financial markets. Deficit countries with a low asset base 
find it hard to attract international credit to finance the deficit. (This deficit in turn 
may be the outcome of an unfavourable distribution of power in commodity 
markets on which many low-income countries depend for export income.) Yet their 
forced adjustment to the deficit automatically corrects the offsetting surpluses. 
Further, Post Keynesian macroeconomics does not presume a norm of full 
employment. Therefore an undue pressure to adjust by deflating deficit economies 
has real deflationary consequences for the world economy. The issue of the 
distribution of the burden of adjustment is thus compounded by the issue of 
increasing difficulties in maintaining global output and employment. 
 The need to curb the power of international financial markets with respect to 
the creation and distribution of credit. The potential instability arising from 
national currencies acting as international money, and the distribution of the burden 
of adjustment as determined by international credit availability, both rest on the 
power of international financial markets to switch currencies and to determine the 
volume and distribution of credit. Because of the uncertainties involved in 
predicting foreign exchange rates and in conducting sovereign risk assessment, the 
markets for foreign exchange and for international credit are speculative and 
potentially highly unstable, being subject to discrete shifts in expectations; the 
consequences of these shifts can be real redistributions and real reductions in 
output and employment. As in the domestic economy, the Post Keynesian approach 
to financial markets is to consider mechanisms for curbing their power, in order to 
create a more stable financial backdrop for real activity. 
 
We now consider in turn the various Post Keynesians who have addressed these 
issues, starting with Davidson. 
 
In the absence of an international money for general use, an issue of particular concern 
is exchange rate arrangements. The exchange instability of the post-Bretton Woods 
period has cast doubt on the capacity of foreign exchange markets to drive exchange 
rates to some equilibrium value. Davidson distinguishes between unionised monetary 
systems (UMS) and non-unionised monetary systems (NUMS), referring to whether or 
not there is a single currency (or currencies are locked together). In other words, the 
appropriate distinction is not between national economies and the international 
economy, but rather between one or more moneys. The significance is that, where 
there is scope for variation in exchange rates between currencies, there is an additional 
layer of uncertainty to contend with. Where there is uncertainty, there is a need for 
liquidity, which raises the issue of the adequacy of the provision of international 
liquidity. While there is an increased demand for foreign exchange to facilitate 
speculative transactions, Davidson is referring to the increased demand for 
precautionary balances to protect traders from a lack of certainty with respect to 
international values. 
 
Because Davidson identifies international financial problems to a considerable extent 
with exchange rate variability, his concern is to advocate an increase in exchange rate 
stability. This argument is reinforced by the argument that floating exchange rates 
encourage the adoption of an export-led growth strategy. Successful export-led growth 
causes exchange rate appreciation, which puts pressure on labour to keep labour costs 
down in order to maintain competitiveness. In aggregate, this strategy cannot succeed; 
one country’s exports success is another’s trade balance deterioration. The net result is 
downward pressure on wages, and on domestic demand. A fixed exchange rate system 
would avoid this outcome. 
 
In terms of the international monetary system as such, Davidson offers a reform plan 
which owes much to Keynes’s plan for an international clearing union. An 
International Clearing Agency (ICA) would record net payments between countries in 
terms of an International Money Clearing Unit (IMCU), which would be a money only 
for central banks (and thus not the object of speculative transactions by the market), 
whose supply was in the hands of the ICA. Records of net payments would provide 
the basis for a trigger mechanism for a symmetrical system of balance of payments 
adjustment. Like Keynes, Davidson identifies the prevalent asymmetrical pressure on 
deficit countries to adjust (due to lack of liquidity) as lending a serious deflationary 
bias to the international economy; a more symmetrical adjustment process would 
remove that bias. The norm in Davidson’s reformed system would be exchange rate 
stability through agreed exchange rates expressed in terms of the IMCU. But there 
would be provision for exchange rate adjustment if efficiency wages at current 
exchange rates were out of line.  
 
While exchange rate stability involving some commitment to announced parities can 
be regarded as a feature of all Post Keynesian ideas for a reformed system, there is 
some difference of opinion as to the appropriate exchange rate regime within a non-
reformed system. Smithin (1994, chapter 7) argues that any country choosing to 
pursue Keynesian demand-management policies (expansionary fiscal policy and low 
interest rates) in an unreformed international monetary system needs the protection of 
floating exchange rates.  Further, he argues that there is a strong centralising tendency 
within monetary systems in general. The need for money which commands confidence 
encourages the centralisation of power in financial centres. Smithin argues that fixed 
exchange rate regimes encourage such centralisation of power within the international 
monetary system. Insofar as power may be centralised with central banks with 
monetarist leanings, the scope for achieving low, stable interest rates is thereby 
limited. Again, floating exchange rates would provide some protection. This argument 
is reinforced by reference to differences between domestic banking systems. As long 
as there are differences of regulation, conventions and behaviour between national 
banking systems,  there will be some segmentation in the global banking market. 
Separate currencies, and currencies separated by value (ie floating) further add to that 
segmentation, allowing a counter to the tendency for centralisation in banking. Put 
another way, foreign exchange is less money-like in a floating exchange rate system. 
In Davidson’s ideal reform plan, the more money-like are the more assets, the better. 
But in Smithin’s less-than-ideal world, floating exchange rates are offered as a 
second-best solution. 
 
However, in a more recent account of developments in the international financial 
system, Smithin (1996) moves further to a more general questioning of the 
preferability of ending floating. He argues that foreign exchange instability since the 
1970s may be the consequence of inappropriate (ie non-Keynesian) macroeconomic 
policy than the main cause of macro policy problems. He is therefore much more 
sanguine than Davidson about the workability of generalised floating as long as 
governments follow Keynesian policies and coordinate with each other. 
 
But, whatever its cause, the exchange instability which has characterised generalised 
floating is still widely held to have been a major contributor to a more general 
instability in international financial markets. Strange (1986; 1994) analyses the growth 
in this instability, and demonstrates the reaction of the international banks in seeking 
to increase the liquidity of their portfolios. This has however coincided with increased 
difficulties for individual economies for whom a floating exchange rate has not been 
adequate for producing external balance. For oil-importing export-dependent 
developing economies which had borrowed extensively in the 1970s from 
international banks, the increasing reluctance of banks to continue lending, together 
with high and variable interest charges on existing debt and weakening export 
markets, led to the debt crisis. 
 
Tarshis (1984) analyses the debt crisis as a global crisis, not an issue of bank risk 
assessment at the micro level (see Palma, 1995, for a more recent account). He saw 
the crisis as having arisen in the vacuum left by the IMF as its power in international 
financial markets diminished with the abandonment of the par value exchange rate 
system. Like Davidson, Tarshis referred to Keynes’s plan for the international 
monetary system for indications of what had been lacking in the design of the IMF: 
symmetrical pressure on surplus and deficit countries to adjust to payments 
imbalance, adequate provision of liquidity, and powers for the IMF independent of the 
interests of major economies. In other words, the debt crisis had arisen because of 
undue pressure on developing countries in deficit, inadequate liquidity provision by 
the IMF to allow adjustment to proceed, and an over-concern with the banks of major 
Western economies relative to the adjustment burden being imposed on debtor 
countries. Tarshis’s proposals for dealing with the debt overhang include debt 
forgiveness, and the provision of liquidity to bail out creditor banks in order to 
maintain confidence in the banking system. But he argued that this support for banks 
should include acquisition of public equity in bailed-out banks (so that banks would  
not benefit unduly) and the commitment of the relevant governments to introduce 
regulation to limit future capacity for credit creation. Indeed, an international 
regulatory and supervisory agency should be established to ensure the prudential 
control of the international banking system.; Henry Kaufman has made a similar 
proposal (see Kelly, 1995, 227). The endogenous credit theory applied to a domestic 
economy has shifted attention from monetary policy as a mechanism for controlling 
monetary aggregates to bank regulation and supervision as a mechanism to promote 
financial stability (see Minsky, 1982). This perspective is carried over to the 
international context by Tarshis. 
 
Attempts to restore and enhance the role of the IMF with respect to the international 
financial system seem at face value to run counter to the tremendous increase in 
financial market power which weakened the IMF in the 1970s. But the debt crisis 
made clear to the banks the limits to their knowledge of borrowers’ economies, and 
their capacity to make borrowers more credit-worthy. As a result they turned to the 
IMF for assistance. This assistance took the form of requiring borrowers to submit to 
the conditions attached to IMF credit in order to be eligible for further bank credit. 
These conditions included structural adjustment programs, consisting largely of 
supply-side policies like financial liberalisation, and monetary controls (supported by 
tight fiscal policy) to control inflation. The result has been a tremendous cost to debtor 
countries, whose difficulties in fact had been the result, at least in part, of tight fiscal 
and monetary policies in creditor countries, as well as of the increasing scale and 
instability  of international financial markets. However, irrespective of the nature of 
the IMFs policies, the market has demonstrated its need for something akin to a world 
central bank; indeed the IMF has in effect been asked to go far beyond the normal 
activities of a national central bank by intervening in bank-borrower credit relations. 
A central bank, like the IMF, has superior knowledge in general, superior knowledge 
of the macro consequences of individual bank decisions in particular, and an 
established relationship with borrowers and lenders which allows it to take on an 
intermediation role. If this role were filled along Keynesian policy lines, the IMF 
could draw in particular on its knowledge of domestic banking systems and their 
relations with the international financial system. 
 
This is not to say that the IMF currently employs its superior access to knowledge in 
the best way. The theoretical presupposition of the IMF’s structural adjustment 
programs is the mainstream one, that saving precedes investment. This contrasts with 
Keynes, who gave primacy to investment; bank credit can allow investment to precede 
saving, and other financial instruments can smooth the process of funding investment 
with saving (see Chick, 1983; see also Studart, 1993, for a restatement in the context 
of development finance).  The focus then of financial policy with respect to 
developing economies should be on encouraging financial markets to perform that 
function effectively. But, as Studart (1995) argues, the IMF emphasis on financial 
efficiency may impede the funding function. Efficient financial markets, in an 
increasingly unstable environment respond by further increasing  financial fragility (as 
evidenced by the behaviour of banks in efficient Western financial markets). Yet the 
IMF (together with the World Bank) persists in its program of encouraging financial 
liberalisation as a means of increasing the provision of saving, despite inadequate 
evidence that financial liberalisation can play any causal role in the economic 
development process (see Arestis and Demetriades, 1993).  
 
Meanwhile, the increasing fragility of the international financial system itself has been 
a focus for discussion as to possible control mechanisms. Keynes had advocated some 
form of control on capital flows even in the 1940s, to allow governments to maintain 
their exchange rate commitments. If there was adequate reason then for being 
concerned about the potential danger of capital flows, the rationale must be 
overwhelming now. The predominant suggestion is Tobin’s (1978) tax proposal, 
whereby a levy would be charged on all foreign exchange transactions, reducing at the 
margin the return on speculative transactions. As Davidson (forthcoming) argues, 
however, the tax would have more impact on trade-related transactions, and could not 
impede the force of speculative flows when foreign exchange gains well in excess of 
the tax are anticipated. Davidson reiterates the need for a stable international monetary 
system based on central bank clearing as the appropriate vehicle for eliminating 
speculation at its root. 
 
An alternative proposal is to route capital flows and trade-related flows through a dual 
exchange rate system (see Soloman, 1989). While it is very difficult to protect such 
systems from abuse, steps have been taken to classify transactions within foreign 
exchange markets. Thus, the Bank of England for example already distinguishes 
between foreign exchange risk arising in the normal course of business, and that 
which is the result of active speculation (see Kelly, 1995).  Indeed Kelly argues that 
this distinction should be applied within derivatives markets. Derivatives trading arose 
initially in order to provide hedge instruments by which traders could cover their 
foreign exchange risk. But now markets in a wide range of instruments have 
developed which redistribute a wider range of risks; the growth of the derivatives 
market has itself added to the sum total of risk, increasing the fragility of the financial 
system. Kelly therefore proposes that the right to engage in derivatives speculation be 
restricted to Special Purpose Vehicles, subject to them achieving high credit ratings. 
Other market participants would only be allowed to engage on hedging. 
 
Guttmann’s (1988) reform proposal, building on Davidson (1982) and Schmitt (1977) 
returns to the approach of discouraging speculation by means of ensuring a stable 
international financial environment. But, on the grounds that the international 
financial system is now dominated by inside money, Guttman argues that that inside 
money should be under the direct control of an international authority. Guttmann thus 
advocates the centralisation of both private and public sector international capital 
flows, requiring that they all be denominated in Supranational Credit Money (SCM) 
issued by a New International Monetary Authority (NIMA). National currencies, 
whose exchange rates with respect to SCM would be fixed, could only be used for 
domestic transactions. This credit money goes beyond Keynes’s (and Davidson’s) 
proposal for an international money as outside money to underpin the structure of 
private sector international credit. While it removes control of the supply of the 
international money from government (international and national), it recognises the 
power which international financial markets have over credit creation regardless of the 
outside money system, and attempts to separate that power from the international 
provision of assets in any one national currency. 
 
The replacement of national currencies by an international money is the central aim of 
the design of European monetary union. The intermediate aim is to eliminate 
structural sources of payments imbalance by means of the economic convergence 
process, in order to proceed to a locking of exchange rates, and the replacement of 
national currencies with a European currency, the Euro. Supply of the Euro is to be 
determined by a centralised European central banking system, along monetarist lines. 
The design of that system of central banking, as being independent of government, 
itself entails the monetarist separation of the monetary from the real (see Arestis and 
Bain, 1995). The convergence process is being facilitiated by a process of financial 
liberalisation. The system would then have the same deflationary bias, the same 
inadequate provision of liquidity to allow time to adjust to payments imbalance, and 
the same tendency for high interest rates and financial fragility as were evident in the 
global financial system under the IMF of the 1980s and 1990s. Further, as the EU 
membership expands to include new members of close-to-developing country status, 
the problems will be exacerbated.  
 
Jespersen (1995) argues that, to be effective, a European central bank should be 
concerned primarily with promoting financial stability. This reflects a Post Keynesian 
concern with the stability of the financial environment in terms of the cost and 
availability of credit, and returns on alternative assets, rather than the mainstream 
focus on stability of monetary aggregates. The significance of the structure and 
behaviour of the banking system for theory and policy has long been stressed by 
Chick. She has applied these ideas to European monetary union in Chick (1993a), 
where she discusses the centralising consequences of opening up the European 
financial system to free competition, where the national components of that system 
have very different histories, structures and behaviour. As Chick and Dow 
(forthcoming,a and forthcoming,b) argue, the shape of the European financial sector 
cannot be foreseen without paying attention to the differences in financial behaviour, 
history and conventions particular to each member. Just as Chick (1993b) argues that 
monetary theory and domestic monetary policy should be contingent on the particular 
nature of the banking system at issue, so in considering international finance we must 
consider the tremendous diversity of banking systems which lurk behind an apparently 
homogeneous international financial system. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Post Keynesian monetary theory focuses on the intrinsic role of money within the 
economic process. Money assists the economic process by providing a unit of account 
for contracts specified in terms of a liquid asset with stable value; that money asset 
may also be held when confidence in the prediction of value of alternative assets is 
low. But money is primarily the liability of the private sector banking system, a by-
product of its lending decisions which are also influenced by the state of confidence. 
If there is a shortage of liquidity relative to demand (regardless of planned saving), 
then economic activity may be discouraged, and output and employment fall. The Post 
Keynesian prescription is to attempt to keep interest rates low when economies are 
operating below full capacity. But above all, policy should be addressed to 
maintaining stable financial conditions so that liquidity preference does not rise in the 
first place. 
 
This theory and policy prescription carry over into the international context, but with 
the significant complication that different currencies offer a range of international 
moneys. If exchange markets are unstable, then preferences as to which currency to 
hold as international money may change, creating balance of payments problems for 
the governments concerned. The greater the degree of payments imbalance, the greater 
the deflationary bias for the world economy, given the greater pressure on deficit 
economies to adjust than surplus economies. Further, the greater the degree of 
instability in international financial markets, the greater the precautionary demand for 
liquid balances, and the higher will be interest rates, adding to the deflationary bias. 
 
Of course, all economic units have balance of payments problems, but most do not 
have the benefit of a separate currency either to segment payments or to change 
relative values. The deflationary bias in payments adjustment is general; but while 
separate currencies may potentially reduce the bias, the consequences of exchange 
speculation enforcing more rapid adjustment than would otherwise be the case (and 
indeed sometimes unwarranted adjustment) may increase deflationary bias. 
 
The key to adjustment, the potential for steadying its pace and for avoiding it when 
imbalances are temporary, lies with the banking system, and its willingness to extend 
credit. The significant distinction then is not so much between deficit and surplus 
economies, as between deficit economies to which the banks are unwilling to extend 
credit, on the one hand, and deficit economies which the banks will fund and surplus 
economies on the other.  
 
Just as at the domestic level the aim is for financial stability and low interest rates, so 
at the international level design of the international monetary system should address 
this aim. (The international financial system operating effectively independently of 
any global system of governance has shown itself incapable of meeting this aim.) 
What is required therefore is a mechanism for separating international money from 
any one national economy, ie a true international money; strict regulation and 
supervision of international banking to reduce instability of capital flows and 
exchange instability and to coordinate financing of payments imbalances; a 
symmetrical system of payments adjustment involving coordination of adjustment 
policies. In other words, what is required is an international clearing union and an 
international credit money, with a forum for policy coordination and a strong bank 
supervisory system. Given the interdependencies between these functions, they should 
all be performed within one agency. 
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